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I. INTRODUCTION
Chain banking is an organizational arrangement whereby two
or more banks are controlled by one or more individuals via com-
mon stock ownership or through interlocking directors and of-
ficers.' Chain banking groups may have an adverse effect on
competition in selected markets if a chain organization controls
more than one bank and a significant percentage of deposits in the
local banking market.2 Recent evidence suggests that chain bank-
ing may significantly increase both deposit concentration in local
markets and the potential for anticompetitive behavior.3
Prior to the recent passage of the Change in Bank Control Act,4
chain organizations or individuals could acquire control of addi-
* Staff Economist, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, and Assistant Professional Lecturer in Finance,
School of Government and Business Administration, The George Washing-
ton University, Washington, D.C. The views expressed are those of the au-
thor and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board or its staff.
1. This definition specifically excludes multiple bank ownership by the same
corporation or partnership, an arrangement more commonly referred to as a
multibank holding company.
2. Chain banking relationships represent only one of the organizational ar-
rangements which may result in concentration of banking resources. Branch
banking and multibank holding companies are the two more common ar-
rangements in which banking resources may be concentrated under central-
ized control. Concentration of bank deposits is higher under these three
organizational arrangements than if all banks were owned separately and op-
erated independently.
3. Keating, Chain Banking in the District, ECON. PERSPECTIVES (Chicago: Fed-
eral Reserve Bank) Sept./Oct., 1977 at 15-20 (copy on file with the Nebraska
Law Review); Rutz, The Impact of Chain Banking on State and Local Market
Concentration: A Case Study (unpublished research study, Washington
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1979) (copy on file
with the Nebraska Law Review).
4. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub.
L No. 95-630, § 602, 92 Stat. 3683 (1978) (Title VI, to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817(j)).
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tional banks without regulatory approval, even though such acqui-
sitions might have significantly anticompetitive effects. 5 This new
Act requires an individual to submit prior written notice and ob-
tain subsequent approval by the appropriate federal banking
agency before acquiring control of a bank or bank holding com-
pany if the transaction is not subject to the provisions of the Bank
Holding Company or Bank Merger Acts.6 The Change in Bank
Control Act provides federal banking agencies power to deny ac-
quisitons of bank control if the competitive effects arising from the
change of control are substantially adverse, that is, if the competi-
tive effects of the change of control, in their judgment, constitute a
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.7 Therefore, the Change in
Bank Control Act initially appears to severely limit the possibility
that expansion-minded chain organizations will lessen competi-
tion by acquiring control of additional banks in a market in which
they own another bank. However, prior policy decisions by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System had already
made these limitations effective for chain relationships involving a
one-bank holding company.8 Consequently, the implications of the
Change in Bank Control Act for chain banking relationships may
not be as significant as one might initially presume because of pre-
vious Board policy decisions. Nevertheless, this new Act is impor-
tant because it imposes competitive standards on acquisition of
control of both banks and bank holding companies by chain bank-
ing organizations or individuals which are almost identical to the
competitive standards imposed on bank mergers and acquisitions
under the Bank Merger and Bank Holding Company Acts.9
5. Chain banking acquisitions are subject to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976), but enforcement proceedings by the Department of Justice have not
been applied frequently.
6. Pub. L No. 95-630, § 602(16), 92 Stat. 3683 (1978).
7. Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)). Both
the Change in Bank Control Act and the Clayton Act employ the phrase "sub-
stantially lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Pub. L. No.
95-630, § 602(7) (b), 92 Stat. 3683 (1978); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
8. These policy decisions established precedents which have already minimized
some of the existing and possible future anticompetitive situations arising
from certain bank acquisitions by chain organizations attempting to convert
the newly acquired banks to one-bank holding companies. See notes 27-32 &
accompanying text infra.
9. The Change in Bank Control Act also imposes standards regarding financial
and managerial considerations for acquisitions of bank control substantially
similar to those imposed under the Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1976), and the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1977 Cum.
Supp.).
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H. TITLE VI OF FIRICA: CHANGE IN BANK
CONTROL ACT OF 1978
The Change in Bank Control Act was passed by Congress on
November 10, 1978, and became effective on March 10, 1979.10 The
three primary federal banking agencies have issued substantially
similar regulations to implement this Act.1 ' The Act requires sixty
days prior written notice of a change of control of an insured bank
or bank holding company by an individual, a group of individuals
acting in concert, or a business. Control is defined in the Act as the
power to direct management or policies either directly or indi-
rectly, or to vote twenty-five percent or more of any class of voting
securities of the bank.12 All three federal supervisory agencies
have established a presumption of control, subject to rebuttal, if
the individual or group acting in concert, or the business, has vot-
ing control of ten percent or more of any class of the institution's
voting stock.13
The Act requires that the written notice contain the personal
history and business background of the individual or business,
certain financial information for the preceding five-year period, the
terms, conditions and source of funds used in the acquisition, and
the intent of those gaining control of the bank or bank holding
company.' 4 Any change of control is automatically granted unless
the primary federal banking agency disapproves of the acquisition
within sixty days. An acquisition of control may be made before
the sixty-day period if the agency notifies the individual in writing
of its intent not to disapprove of the transaction.' 5
Most importantly, however, the appropriate federal banking
10. Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 602, 95 Stat. 3683 (1978).
11. The primary or appropriate federal banking agency includes the Comptroller
of the Currency for national banks, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for state member banks and bank holding companies, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for state nonmember in-
sured banks.
12. Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 602(8) (b), 95 Stat. 3683 (1978).
13. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225.139 (1979). Most corporations acquiring control of a bank
will continue to file under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842
(1977 Cum. Supp.), and not the Change in Bank Control Act. There may be
some instances, however, in which acquisition of 10% of the stock of a bank
by a business will be insufficient to classify that business as a bank holding
company. In these instances, the business may be required to file under the
new Act. It should be noted that the new Act was directed primarily at
changes in bank and bank holding company control by individuals, and not
businesses.
14. Pub. L No. 95-630, § 602(6), 92 Stat. 3683 (1978). However, the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation Y requires only current financial statements for in-
dividuals, but reserves the right to request additional information if deemed
necessary. See 44 Fed. Reg. 7121 (1979) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(b)).
15. Pub. L No. 95-630, § 602(1), 92 Stat. 3683 (1978).
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agency may disapprove any proposed acquisition of bank control
if:
(A) the proposed acquisition of control would result in a monopoly or
would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize
or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the
United States;
(B) the effect of the proposed acquisition of control in any section of
the country may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create
a monopoly or the proposed acquisition of control would in any other man-
ner be in restraint of trade, and the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
acquisition of control are not clearly outweighed in the public interest by
the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served,
(C) the financial condition of any acquiring person is such as might
jeopardize the financial stability of the bank or prejudice the interests of
the depositors of the bank;
(D) the competence, experience, or integrity of any acquiring person
or of any of the proposed management personnel indicates that it would
not be in the interest of the depositors of the bank, or in the interest of the
public to permit such person to control the bank .... 16
The legislative history of Title VI indicates that the Change in
Bank Control Act was passed primarily to prevent speculative
purchases of small banks by irresponsible individuals with ques-
tionable integrity. The major concern was that banks were being
bought and sold with little or no equity investment by certain indi-
viduals and often with a clear intent to use the bank's resources for
personal gain.17 These practices have resulted in a relatively large
percentage of bank failures during the past twenty years.18 There-
fore, the regulatory power provided the federal banking agencies
to deny a change of bank control on the basis of the personal fac-
tors specified in the Act' 9 effectively strengthened the require-
ments for a notice of change of management control specified in
the statute prior to this amendment.20
16. Id. § 602(7).
17. See 123 CONG. REc. H.8856 (Aug. 5. 1977) (remarks of Rep. St. Germain);
HousE COMM. ON BANKING, FNANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FNANCIAL INsTrrU-
TIONS REGULATORY ACT OF 1978, H. REP. No. 95-1383, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1978).
18. Of the 101 banks that failed between 1960 and 1977, 83.2% of the failures were
primarily caused by fraudulent or improper insider activity including embez-
zlement, self-serving loans, and various other insider manipulations and de-
falcations. The Safe Banking Act of 1977- Hearings on H.R. 9086 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2526 (1977) (letter from FDIC Chairman LeMaistre, enclosure "B").
19. Pub. L No. 95-630, § 602(7) (C) & (D), 92 Stat. 3683 (1978).
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1976).
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A. Similarities to Bank Merger and Bank Holding Company Acts
The similarities between the Change in Bank Control Act of
1978 and the Bank Holding Company and Bank Merger Acts are
readily apparent. Both the Bank Merger Act of 196021 and the
Bank Holding Company Act of 195622 require the appropriate fed-
eral banking agency to evaluate banking, financial and managerial
factors, as well as competitive effects resulting from a proposed
merger or acquisition before issuing a decision on a particular
transaction. If substantially adverse competitive effects emanate
from the proposed merger or acquisition,23 that is, if section 7 of
the Clayton Act has been violated, the application is usually de-
nied unless public interest considerations related to the financial
and managerial factors and the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served clearly outweigh any anticompetitive effects. 24
The primary difference between the Change in Bank Control
Act and the Bank Holding Company and Bank Merger Acts is that
the new Act extends the same standards to transactions involving
individuals. For the first time Congress has mandated a direct
evaluation of the competitive effects of chain banking organiza-
tions.25 However, the competitive implications of this new Act
may not be as significant as one might initially expect because re-
cent decisions by the Board of Governors have largely minimized
the anticompetitive effects associated with the expansion and for-
mation of chains via one-bank holding companies.
III. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD DECISIONS: FINANCIAL
AND MANAGERIAL STANDARDS
Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Board of Governors
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1976).
23. See note 5 & accompanying text supra.
24. Realistically, one of the few defenses for a substantially adverse competitive
proposal is that one of the banks is a failing firm. See Edwards, Bank Mergers
and the Public Interest: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the 1966 Bank
Merger Act, 85 BANKING L.J. 753 (1968); Golden, Preparing the Convenience
and Needs Defense Under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 96 BANKING L.J. 100
(1979); Jessee & Seelig, An Analysis of the Public Benefits Test of the Bank
Holding Company Act, 56 MoNTrLY REVIEW 151 (New York: Federal Reserve
Bank, 1974).
25. The competitive standards contained in the Change in Bank Control Act
were apparently included to maintain similarity with the Bank Merger Act
and the Bank Holding Company Act. During the discussions and hearings on
the bill, almost no mention was made of chain banking or its competitive ef-
fects. See 123 CONG. REC. H.6543 (Oct. 25, 1977); 123 CONG. REc. H.11,714 (Oct.
27, 1977); 124 CONG. REc. H.11,410 (Oct. 3, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. H.11,719 (Oct.
5, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. S.19,144 (Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
See notes 17-18 & accompanying text supra.
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is required to take into consideration the financial condition, man-
agerial resources and future prospects of the proposed holding
company and the bank to be acquired.2 6 However, in this capacity
the Board has been somewhat less restrictive with respect to
financial considerations in cases involving the establishment of a
single one-bank holding company than in cases involving mul-
tibank holding companies. This policy has been established to fa-
cilitate management succession at many of the smaller,
independent banks throughout the country.27
The Board has held, however, that this less restrictive policy
should not apply to those situations where individuals are involved
in establishing a series or chain of one-bank holding companies. In
such cases, the Board has analyzed the applications under stan-
dards that are normally applied to multibank holding companies.
The Board recognized the interdependence of the banks in a chain
of one-bank holding companies and the distinct possibility that the
financial and managerial resources of one or more of the banks in
the chain may be used to support the operations of other members
in the chain banking group.28 Thus, the similarities between a
chain of one-bank holding companies and a multibank holding
company require the use of similar standards when analyzing
financial and managerial considerations of both. This policy was
first established in January 1974 and recent decisions by the Board
have continued to emphasize its importance. 29
A. Competitive Standards
The Bank Holding Company Act also requires that the Board of
Governors take into consideration the competitive effects of a pro-
posed acquisition of a bank. If substantial anticompetitive effects
emanate from the proposed acquisition, the application will usu-
ally be denied.30 However, if less than substantially anticompeti-
tive effects result from the transaction, the application will usually
be approved if considerations relating to the convenience and
needs of the community to be served and financial and managerial
resources of the applicant bank holding company outweigh the an-
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976).
27. See Nebraska Banco, Inc., Ord, Nebraska, 62 FED. RES. BULL. 638 (1976) (order
denying application).
28. Id. at 639.
29. See American Natl Sidney Corp., Sidney, Nebraska, 66 FED. RES. BULL 159
(1980) (order denying application); Eicher Bancorporation, Iowa City, Iowa,
64 FED. REs. BuLL. 399 (1978) (order denying application); Commercial Bank-
shares, Grand Island, Nebraska, 61 FED. RES. BuLL. 807 (1975) (order approv-
ing application); BHCO, Inc., Hardin, Montana, 60 FED. REs. BuLL. 123 (1974)
(order denying application).
30. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
1980]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ticompetitive effects. 31 This analytical process has traditionally
been applied by the Board in cases involving acquisitions of banks
by multibank holding companies. Recently, however, these same
competitive standards have been applied to formations of one-
bank holding companies in cases where the applicant's principals
are also associated with other banks or one-bank holding compa-
nies in a chain banking arrangement.
In May 1977, the Board denied an application to form a one-
bank holding company on the basis of adverse competitive effects
resulting from affiliation of the applicant's principals with another
bank in the same geographic market.32 This denial established a
precedent: the Board refused to sanction the use of one-bank
holding companies to aid, further and perpetuate existing anticom-
petitive arrangements involving chain banking organizations. The
Board has stated that although denial of these applications might
not immediately alter the anticompetitive relationships which ex-
ist between certain banks affiliated with the same chain banking
organization, denial would strengthen the prospect that they
would become independent and competing organizations in the fu-
ture.33 On the other hand, the Board has also noted that approval
of applications involving one-bank holding company chain organi-
zations would solidify and strengthen common ownership and
eliminate or significantly diminish the likelihood of disaffiliation of
the banks and deconcentration of the local markets in the future.34
31. It is unclear whether the Bank Holding Company Act requires the weighing
process only in substantially adverse competitive acquisitions (those involv-
ing violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act). However, the FDIC denied a
merger case in 1970 under the Bank Merger Act (which employs language
identical to the Bank Holding Company Act) solely on the basis of less than
substantially adverse competitive factors. This decision was reversed by the
district court and affirmed by the circuit court. See Washington Mut. Sav.
Bank and Grays Harbor Say. & Loan Assn. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 482
F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973).
32. See Mahaska Investment Co., Oskaloosa, Iowa, 63 FED. REs. BUL_ 579 (1977)
(order denying application). Actually, the Board has always considered the
competitive effects of affiliation, but this case was the first to be denied on
that basis.
33. The primary reason is that purchasing control of banks with debt is consider-
ably less costly through a one-bank holding company because of substantial
tax savings. This may make it more difficult for individuals to maintain con-
trol of the banks. See note 39 infra. In addition, of course, the Board of Gov-
ernors could notify the Department of Justice of its findings and the
Department of Justice may decide to take action.
34. See Mid-Nebraska Bancshares, Inc., Ord, Nebraska. 64 FaD. REs. BuL. 589
(1978) (order denying a one-bank holding company application involving an-
ticompetitive chain banking relationships); Midwest Bancorp, Inc., Gardner,
Illinois, 64 FED. RES. BuLL. 317 (1978) (same); Citizens Bancorp, Inc., Hartford
City, Indiana, 63 FED. REs. BuL. 1083 (1977) (same).
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B. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v.
First Lincolnwood Corp.
In most cases involving chain relationships, the anticompetitive
chain banking arrangement is established through the purchase
and control of a bank in a market in which the same chain organi-
zation already controlled another bank. An application to form a
one-bank holding company is then filed with the Board to obtain
certain benefits inherent in the one-bank holding company form of
organization,35 and the Board subsequently denies these applica-
tions if the competitive effects are substantially adverse. The
Board's authority to deny the formation of a one-bank holding
company on the basis of pre-existing, unfavorable aspects, even
though the formation would neither cause nor enhance existing
adverse effects, has recently been upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court.3 6 Although the First Lincolnwood case involved pre-ex-
isting adverse financial factors, the rationale of the Board's author-
ity to deny a one-bank holding company formation appears to be
equally applicable to an anticompetitive chain banking arrange-
ment, especially in light of the Bank Holding Company Act's
strong emphasis against anticompetitive combinations. In Mid-Ne-
braska Bancshares, Inc., the Court of Appeals, primarily relying on
the First Lincolnwood decision, has recently upheld the Board's
authority to deny one-bank holding company applications involv-
ing anticompetitive chain banking relationships. 37 Thus, the
Board has taken the position, upheld by the Supreme Court, that it
may deny bank holding company applications on the basis of con-
ditions which predate the proposed bank holding company forma-
tion.38
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW ACT
The one-bank holding company form of organization offers
significant financial benefits in the form of enhanced cash flows
35. Most of the benefits involve tax considerations and the ability of one-bank
holding companies to enter into nonbanking business operations permitted
under 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976) and 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1979).
36. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S.
234 (1978).
37. Mid-Nebraska Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
No. 78-1658 (D.C. Cir., decided Feb. 15, 1980).
38. See notes 36-37 & accompanying text infra; Lake Jackson Bancshares, Inc.,
Lake Jackson, Texas, 66 FED. REs. BuLL. - (1980) (order denying application
which involved anticompetitive chain banking relationships); Childress
Bancshares, Inc., Childress, Texas, 66 FED. REs. BuLT. 160 (1980) (same);
Caneyville Bancshares, Inc., Caneyville, Kentucky, 65 FED. REs. BuL.m 759
(1979) (same); First State Bancorporation, Fredericksburg, Iowa, 65 FED. REs.
BumL. 256 (1979) (same).
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due to substantial tax savings permitted by federal tax laws.
These benefits are particularly attractive if the one-bank holding
company utilizes corporate debt to finance the acquisition of a
bank and make it much easier for individuals to purchase control
of banks through one-bank holding companies than for individuals
to gain control of banks with personal debt.3 9 The Board's policy of
denying formations of one-bank holding companies involved in an-
ticompetitive chain banking arrangements effectively withholds
these benefits and serves as an effective restraint on the ability of
most anticompetitive chains to continue and prosper. The inher-
ent economic and wealth restrictions and lack of access to the na-
tional capital markets provide additional limitations on the ability
of individuals to establish and operate anticompetitive non-one-
bank holding company chain banking organizations. The Board's
policy and the inherent wealth constraints on individuals have
served to severely limit widespread anticompetitive chain banking
39. The primary tax benefits arise in two ways. First, if a corporation, e.g., a one-
bank holding company, owns 80% or more of the outstanding stock of a sub-
sidiary (such as a bank), the corporation may deduct 100% of the dividends
received from that subsidiary for income tax purposes. Individuals may de-
duct only $100 of corporate dividends. Thus one-bank holding companies
may escape "double taxation" of dividends while individuals cannot. Sec-
ondly, a one-bank holding company owning 80% or more of the outstanding
stock of the bank may fie a consolidated tax return with the bank. It is im-
portant to note that stock ownership in the one-bank holding company must
be precisely structured to prevent the IRS from classifying the arrangement
as a personal holding company and subsequently levying taxes at the maxi-
mum marginal rate of 70%. Because the taxable income received by the one-
bank holding company is usually considerably less than the interest expense
on the acquisition debt, the one-bank holding company experiences a loss for
income tax purposes. These losses may be consolidated with the income of
the bank to reduce taxes paid by the bank. This permits bank ownership by
one-bank holding companies to generate greater cash flows than bank owner-
ship by individuals for use in servicing the acquisition debt. In effect, one-
bank. holding companies are permitted to retire the acquisition debt with
before-tax dollars while individuals must retire the principal of the acquisi-
tion debt with after-tax dollars, and this makes it considerably more costly to
acquire control of bank stock with personal debt. For example, on a $900,000
twelve-year bank stock loan at an interest rate of 9%, it has been estimated
that a one-bank holding company formation will generate over $900,000 in ad-
ditional cash flows during the twelve-year period than similar ownership by
an individual. The additional cash flows are the result of the tax savings
available through corporate bank ownership. See Rutz, Financing Control of
Bank Stock With Acquisition Debt: An Analytical Approach to the Tax Bene-
fits of One-Bank Holding Companies (unpublished research study, Washing-
ton D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1979) (copy on
file with the Nebraska Law Review). See also, Proposition 5: IBAA Seeks to
Rescind Fed. In-House Guidelines Weighted Against Small One-Bank Hold-
ing Companies, 28 INDEPENDENT BANKER 9 (Aug. 1978); Ritz, Bank Holding
Company Consolidated Tax Returns, 90 BNKNG L.J. 20 (1973).
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arrangements involving one-bank holding companies.40
This analysis suggests that the Change in Bank Control Act
may have only slightly more restrictive effects than the Federal
Reserve Board's policy. The practical effects of the new Act are
simply to provide the federal banking agencies with the prior au-
thority to deny an acquisition of control of a bank or bank holding
company which would result in an anticompetitive situation.41
This authority, granted to all three banking agencies, will be more
effective than the Board's policy of refusing to sanction perma-
nently existing anticompetitive chain banking arrangements
through the formation of one-bank holding companies. The reason
is that the Board's policy assumes that withholding the financial
benefits of the one-bank holding company form of organization will
serve as a forceful inducement for chains to disassociate them-
selves with banks in markets where the competitive effects are
substantially adverse.42 The new Act, however, gives the federal
banking agencies the power to deny anticompetitive changes of
bank control before consideration is given to a possible one-bank
holding company formation by the Board of Governors. 43
On April 27, 1979, in the first case to come before any of the fed-
eral banking agencies under the Change in Bank Control Act, the
Board of Governors denied a notice for change of control on the
basis of significantly adverse competitive effects. This case in-
volved the proposed acquisition of control of the New Mexico Ban-
corporation, Inc., which is the fifth largest banking organization in
New Mexico with $173 million of total deposits. New Mexico Ban-
corporation owns a relatively small bank (deposits of $35 million)
40. In addition, the Board's policy probably also serves as a substantial deterrent
to chain organizations attempting to gain control of a bank where the chain
already controls a significant percentage of the deposits within the local
banking market. This would be especially true in situations where the chain
planned to file a one-bank holding company application for the newly ac-
quired bank.
41. Another important effect of the Act is that it provides the federal banking
agencies with the power to deny changes of bank control if they have reason
to believe that the new ownership may become involved in self-dealing.
42. In fact, in many cases this is the result.
43. A potential conflict exists between the Bank Holding Company Act and the
Change in Bank Control Act and any decisions that may be handed down by
the three federal bank regulatory agencies. Suppose, for example, that a no-
tice for change of bank control is filed with the Comptroller of the Currency
and subsequently approved. The principals of the bank may then decide to
file an application to form a bank holding company and the Board of Gover-
nors could conceivably deny the application on the basis of adverse financial
or competitive factors. A situation could arise where one federal banking
agency approves a notice for change of bank control while the Board of Gov-
ernors could deny essentially the same proposal under the Bank Holding
Company Act.
1980]
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which ranked seventh in the Albuquerque banking market.44
However, the proposed purchasers already controlled the First Na-
tional Bank in Albuquerque, which is the third largest banking or-
ganization in New Mexico with $370 million of total deposits. This
bank was the second largest in the Albuquerque banking market
and controlled 23.8% of total market deposits. Assuming the
purchase had been consummated, the principals would have con-
trolled both organizations with a combined market share in the Al-
buquerque banking market of 26.1%. This proposal represented a
significantly adverse competitive effect in the local market and vio-
lated Department of Justice merger guidelines.4 5 Consequently,
the Board of Governors denied the notice for change of bank con-
trol.46
The New Mexico Bancorporation decision tends to suggest that
notice for change of bank control will be approved or disapproved
in a manner similar to decisions under the Bank Merger and Bank
Holding Company Acts. Therefore the Change in Bank Control
Act provides the authority for the federal banking agencies to pre-
vent anticompetitive chain banking relationships in the future and
the Board's policy will continue to serve as a deterrent to existing
anticompetitive chains planning to convert these banks to one-
bank holding company form of organization.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Change in Bank Control Act of 1978 requires individuals to
notify the federal banking agencies prior to a change of bank or
bank holding company control. The Act provides the banking
agencies the authority to deny a notice for change of control on the
basis of adverse competitive factors. As a result, Congress has in-
dicated for the first time a direct concern for the potentially signifi-
cant anticompetitive effects which may result from acquisitions of
bank control by chain banking organizations.
Implications of the new Act, however, may not have great sig-
44. The bank had a 2.3% share of the Albuquerque banking market.
45. See, The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L.
& ECON. 180 (1969); Meehan, Rules vs. Discretion: A Reevaluation of the
Merger Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 23 ANTrrrtusT Buiz. 769 (1979).
46. All information was obtained in a letter to Mr. John T. Mitchell, the attorney
for the proposed purchasers in the New Mexico Bancorporation case and is
available through the Freedom of Information Office, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 20551. Contrary to decisions
under the Bank Holding Company Act which are publicly disclosed through
formal Board Press Releases and cited in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, deci-
sions under the Change in Bank Control Act are made public simply by plac-
ing the letter to the applicant (or applicant's attorneys) in the Board's public
information file.
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nificance because of previous policy decisions by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. In 1977 the Board began to
deny applications to form one-bank holding companies in situa-
tions involving significantly anticompetitive chain banking rela-
tionships. This policy, in conjunction with the inherent financial
constraints on individuals who attempt to establish large chain or-
ganizations, may have effectively minimized most of the anticom-
petitive problems associated with certain chain banking groups.
Nevertheless, the Change in Bank Control Act has filled the previ-
ous void which allowed chain banking organizations to acquire
control of additional banks without agency approval even though
the competitive effects of such acquisitions may have been sub-
stantially adverse and in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In light of the first case to be decided under the Change in Bank
Control Act, it appears the new Act will be effective.
